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ABSTRACT
In 2013, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) published its
Disparate Impact Final Rule in which it sought to formalize its longstanding interpretation
of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by setting forth a three-part
burden-shifting framework. HUD subsequently revisited its disparate impact standard
following the 2015 Supreme Court ruling in Inclusive Communities and published a
Proposed Rule on August 19, 2019. On September 24, 2020, HUD published a new Final
Rule substantially altering the disparate impact standard laid out by the 2013 Rule.
This Comment will analyze the similarities and differences between the disparate impact
standard in the 2013 Rule and the standard set forth in the current, 2020 Rule.
Additionally, given that the 2020 Rule was drafted in response to Inclusive
Communities, this Comment will examine whether, and to what extent, the 2020 Rule
is consistent with the Court’s ruling. Finally, this Comment will address the criticism leveled
at the 2020 Rule by fair housing advocates and explore potential consequences of the new
standard. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that, although the 2020 Rule finds some
textual support in Inclusive Communities for several elements of its new framework,
given the broad remedial purpose of the FHA, the core mission of HUD to eradicate housing
discrimination, the potential, negative consequences of the new standard, and President
Biden’s recent memorandum on housing discrimination, HUD should abandon the 2020
Rule and readopt the 2013 Rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
published its Disparate Impact Final Rule (2013 Rule) in which it sought to
formalize its longstanding interpretation of disparate impact liability under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) by setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework.1
HUD subsequently revisited its disparate impact standard following a 2015
Supreme Court ruling in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,2 and published a Proposed Rule on August 19,
1. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, l1,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2013)).
2. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 546
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2019.3 Ultimately, on September 24, 2020, HUD published a substantially altered
version of its disparate impact standard in a new Final Rule (2020 Rule).4
This Comment will analyze the similarities and differences between the
disparate impact standard in the 2013 Rule and the standard set forth in the
current, 2020 Rule. Additionally, given that the 2020 Rule was drafted in
response to Inclusive Communities, this Comment will also examine whether, and
to what extent, the 2020 Rule is consistent with the Court’s ruling. Finally, this
Comment will address the criticism leveled at the 2020 Rule by fair housing
advocates and explore potential consequences of the new standard. Ultimately,
this Comment will argue that, although the 2020 Rule finds some textual support
in Inclusive Communities for several elements of its new framework, given the broad
remedial purpose of the FHA, the core mission of HUD to eradicate housing
discrimination, the potential, negative consequences of the new standard, and
President Biden’s recent memorandum on housing discrimination, HUD should
abandon the 2020 Rule and readopt the 2013 Rule.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT
The origins of HUD are rooted in legislation enacted in the 1930s in response
to the Great Depression.5 The Federal Housing Administration was created in
1934 and established mortgage insurance programs to make homeownership
more affordable.6 Several years later, in 1937, Congress passed the U.S. Housing
Act which provided public housing for low-income individuals.7 Decades later,
Congress replaced both the National Housing Agency and the Housing and
Home Finance Agency with a new cabinet-level agency: HUD.8 Since its
inception, HUD has focused on establishing housing programs that take into
account various political, economic, and social issues.9 Accordingly, there are five
main policies at the core of HUD’s mission: (1) “Increasing Homeownership”; (2)
“Assisting Low-Income Renters”; (3) “Improving the Physical, Social, and
Economic Health of Cities”; (4) “Fighting Discrimination in Housing Markets”;
and (5) “Assisting Homeless Individuals with Housing and Support Services.”10

(2015).
3. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
42,854 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
4. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
5. K. Heidi Smucker, Comment, No Place Like Home: Defining HUD’s Role in the Affordable
Housing Crisis, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 633, 634 (2019).
6. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., ADVOCATES’ GUIDE 2017: A PRIMER ON FEDERAL
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ch. 1, at 5 (2017).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Smucker, supra note 5, at 634.
10. LAWRENCE L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF HUD 2 fig. 1.1 (2006).
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B. HISTORY OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Housing segregation in the United States is not the result of some historic
accident but rather the decades-long result of the interaction of several dynamics,
including systemic discrimination, public and private housing policies, and
economic disparities.11 During the Great Migration from 1910 to 1970,
approximately six million African Americans migrated “from the South to urban
centers in other parts of the country.”12 In the first few decades of the twentieth
century, Whites reacted to this influx of African Americans by using restrictive
deed covenants, discriminatory zoning practices, and discriminatory financing
tactics to prohibit African Americans from living in certain neighborhoods.13
Federal housing policies in the 1930s under the New Deal and the Fair Housing
Administration effectively reinforced and institutionalized housing segregation
and racial discrimination.14 In the next few decades, the country witnessed the
continued expansion of discriminatory housing policies with the introduction of
practices such as blockbusting and redlining.15 Blockbusting is a tactic employed
by real estate agents in which agents convince White homeowners that minorities
are moving into their neighborhood in order to instill fear in them, resulting in
White flight to other neighborhoods.16 Redlining is a discriminatory practice in
which banks refuse to provide loans to minorities or provide loans at substantially
higher interest rates.17 Even in the 1960s, as deaths from the Vietnam War “fell
heaviest upon young, poor African American and Hispanic infantrymen,”18 at
home in the United States, the families of these soldiers faced continued racial
discrimination in the housing market.19 Those that returned from the war were
relegated to segregated veterans’ homes.20
In 1967, the nation experienced one hundred sixty-four race riots in urban
cities across the country.21 The National Guard was called in to manage several of
these protests.22 The riots in Detroit, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey, were
particularly significant and resulted in thousands of people injured and
widespread property damage across the cities.23 Many citizens were concerned that

11. Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and the Supreme Court’s
Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539, 550 (2014).
12. The Great Migration, 1910 to 1970, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 13, 2012),
https://www.census.gov/dataviz/visualizations/020/ [https://perma.cc/AQE2-72W4].
13. Schneider, supra note 11, at 550.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 551.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 551–52.
18. History
of
Fair
Housing,
HUD.GOV,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history
[https://perma.cc/5YDD-8XGN].
19. Id.
20. Schneider, supra note 11, at 552.
21. Bethany A. Corbin, Should I Stay or Should I Go?: The Future of Disparate Impact Liability Under
the Fair Housing Act and Implications for the Financial Services Industry, 120 PA. ST. L. REV. 421, 428
(2015).
22. Id. at 428–29.
23. Id.
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the country was “rapidly approaching a state of anarchy.”24 In response to the race
riots and social unrest, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) to investigate
the situation, publish a report on the causes of the unrest, and propose possible
solutions.25 The final report began by stating the Kerner Commission’s basic
conclusion: that “[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.”26 The Kerner Commission found that racial
discrimination and segregation in employment, education, and housing were
largely to blame for the social unrest.27 To achieve its ultimate goal of moving
toward “a single society and a single American identity,” the Kerner Commission
recommended taking concrete steps to eliminate racial segregation and
discrimination in employment, education, and housing.28 Regarding housing in
particular, the Kerner Commission suggested enacting a comprehensive federal
anti-discrimination law for the sale and rental of all housing.29
In the two years prior to 1968, fair housing legislation repeatedly stalled in
Congress.30 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
and other civil rights organizations had thus far been unsuccessful in pushing fair
housing legislation through Congress.31 In March 1968, housing legislation
cosponsored by Senator Edward Brooke III, the first African American member
popularly elected to the U.S. Senate,32 and Senator Walter Mondale, had again
been blocked in the Senate.33 However, following the release and publicity of the
Kerner Commission Report, the Senate narrowly passed the FHA and sent it to
the House for consideration.34 But given the conservative makeup of the House,
the FHA was expected to fail once again.35 However, the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968, rapidly accelerated the Fair Housing
Act’s progress in the House, which passed the bill without debate. 36 The bill was
signed by President Johnson only seven days later on April 11, 1968.37 The bill
represented “the last major piece of legislation to come out of the contemporary
civil rights movement.”38
24. Id. at 429.
25. Susan T. Gooden & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Kerner Commission Report Fifty Years Later:
Revisiting the American Dream, 4 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 1, 1 (2018).
26. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
27. Id. at chs. 4, 8.
28. Id. at ch. 17.
29. Id.
30. History of Fair Housing, supra note 18.
31. Schneider, supra note 11, at 552.
32. Edward
Brooke:
A
Featured
Biography,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/senators/FeaturedBios/Featured_Bio_Brooke.htm
[https://perma.cc/U8UB-FHXJ].
33. Schneider, supra note 11, at 553.
34. Corbin, supra note 21, at 430.
35. Id.
36. Id.; Schneider, supra note 11, at 553.
37. Schneider, supra note 11, at 553.
38. Elizabeth Julian, The Fair Housing Act at Fifty: Time for a Change, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133,
1134 (2019).
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C. FAIR HOUSING ACT PROTECTIONS
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the FHA, was intended
to supplement the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1964.39 The FHA begins with a broad
declaration that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”40 To
further this goal, the FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing, in residential real estate transactions, and in the provision of brokerage
services on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, or
disability.41 The Secretary of HUD was granted the “authority and responsibility
for administering” the FHA.42 The Secretary has the authority to make
appropriate rules in order to administer the Act but must provide an opportunity
for the public to comment on any proposed rules.43
D. HUD’S INTERPRETATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
For the past several decades, HUD has interpreted the FHA to prohibit both
intentional housing discrimination and facially neutral practices that have a
discriminatory effect.44 Consistent with HUD’s interpretation, the eleven federal
courts of appeals that have considered the issue have also held that the FHA
creates liability for discriminatory effects.45 However, between HUD’s
adjudication and the eleven federal courts of appeals, variation regarding the
discriminatory effects standard soon arose because the FHA does not actually
provide a specific standard for establishing discriminatory effects claims.46 For
example, although HUD has long used a three-part burden-shifting framework,
the Seventh Circuit chose to use a four-factor balancing test instead.47 The Sixth
and Tenth Circuits combined a burden-shifting framework and a balancing test

39. History of Fair Housing, supra note 18.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
41. Id. §§ 3604–3606.
42. Id. § 3608(a).
43. Id. § 3614a.
44. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2013)).
45. Id. at 11,462; see, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934–35 (2d Cir. 1988);
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs.,
736 F.2d 983, 986–87 (4th Cir. 1984); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir.
1986); Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366,
371 (6th Cir. 2007); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974); Keith
v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir. 1988); Reinhart v. Lincoln County, 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th
Cir. 2007); Hallmark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Jackson v. Okaloosa County., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994)).
46. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,460.
47. Id. at 11,462; see, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290. The four factors include the
strength of the discriminatory effect, evidence of discriminatory intent, the defendant’s interest in
the challenged policy, and whether the plaintiff seeks to restrain the defendant’s action or compel
the defendant to take affirmative steps. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290.
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into one standard.48 The Fourth Circuit adopted a four-factor balancing test for
public defendants and a burden-shifting test for private defendants.49
III. THE 2013 DISPARATE IMPACT FINAL RULE
A. PURPOSE OF THE 2013 RULE
In 2013, HUD published its Disparate Impact Final Rule.50 In doing so, HUD
sought to formalize its longstanding interpretation of discriminatory effects
liability under the FHA.51 To provide national uniformity, HUD set forth a threepart burden-shifting framework to prove a discriminatory effects violation under
the FHA.52 HUD hoped that establishing a formal burden-shifting framework
would provide “greater clarity and predictability” for parties in understanding how
the discriminatory effects standard applies in the housing context.53 In its
publication in the Federal Register, HUD stressed that the 2013 Rule was not
intended to create new substantive law, but rather was meant to reflect
discriminatory effects liability as understood by HUD, the Department of Justice,
several federal agencies, and eleven federal courts of appeals.54
B. THE THREE-PART BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK
Under HUD’s 2013 Rule, the plaintiff had the initial burden of proving its
prima facie case that the challenged practice results in a discriminatory impact on
the basis of a protected characteristic under the FHA.55 The 2013 Rule defined
“[a] practice [as having] a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably
results in a disparate impact on a group of persons,” or results in a perpetuation
of housing segregation, “because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.”56 If the plaintiff successfully established its prima facie
case, the burden of proof then shifted to the defendant to prove that its challenged
practice could be supported by a “legally sufficient justification.”57 Such a
justification included showing that the challenged practice was necessary to
accomplish one of the defendant’s “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests” and that these interests could not be accomplished by “another practice
48. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,462; see, e.g., Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 373–74 (merging the burden-shifting framework with
three additional factors); Mountain Side Mobile Ests. P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev. ex rel.
VanLoozenoord, 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 1995) (adopting the Sixth Circuit’s disparate impact
analysis framework).
49. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,462 n.33; see, e.g., Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 n.5.
50. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,460.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 11,462.
55. Id. at 11,460; 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013) (amended 2020).
56. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013) (amended 2020).
57. Id. § 100.500(b).
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that has a less discriminatory effect.”58 If the defendant successfully carried its
burden by establishing a legally sufficient justification for its practice, the burden
then shifted back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s “substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests” could be achieved through an alternative
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.59
IV. THE 2015 SUPREME COURT RULING IN INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITIES
In 2015, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA in Inclusive Communities.60 Under 26
U.S.C. § 42, the federal government is able to provide low-income housing tax
credits to housing developers through designated state agencies.61 In Texas, the
designated state agency that distributes these tax credits is the Texas Department
of Housing and Community Affairs (the Department).62 Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc. (ICP) is a Texas-based nonprofit organization that helps low-income
families secure affordable housing.63 In 2008, ICP brought suit against the
Department on a disparate impact claim under the FHA.64 ICP alleged that the
Department’s allocation of tax credits resulted in the perpetuation of segregated
housing patterns.65 Specifically, ICP alleged that the Department granted a
disproportionately large number of tax credits in predominantly Black, inner-city
areas and did not grant enough credits in predominantly White, suburban areas.66
For example, the district court found that the Department granted tax credits for
approximately fifty percent of proposed housing in predominantly non-White
areas but only granted thirty-seven percent of proposed housing in predominantly
White areas.67
The district court ruled in favor of ICP and the Department appealed, during
which time HUD issued its 2013 Rule and codified its burden-shifting
framework.68 The Fifth Circuit, relying on HUD’s 2013 Rule, determined that
the district court had improperly placed the burden of proving alternative
practices on the Department and reversed the case on the merits.69 The
Department then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.70
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims are

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
576 U.S. 519, 525 (2015).
26 U.S.C. § 42(a).
Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 525.
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 528.
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cognizable under the FHA.71 However, rather than simply relying on the burdenshifting framework from HUD’s 2013 Rule, the Court based its analysis on the
results-oriented language of the FHA, the Court’s interpretation of similar
language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), later amendments to the
FHA, and the FHA’s statutory purpose.72 After a brief discussion of the historical
context in which the FHA was enacted, the Court turned to two federal antidiscrimination laws to guide its interpretation of the FHA: Title VII and the
ADEA.73 The Court concluded that these two statutes demonstrate that antidiscrimination statutes must be interpreted to allow disparate impact liability
when the text of the statute references the consequences of actions and when such
interpretation is consistent with the purpose behind the statute.74 Accordingly,
the Court found that both Title VII and the ADEA support the finding that the
FHA allows disparate impact claims.75 The Court also considered Congressional
amendments to the FHA enacted in 1988.76 The Court argued that at the time of
the amendments Congress was aware of precedent from several courts of appeals
that recognized disparate impact liability under the FHA and chose to reject a
proposed amendment that would have excluded disparate impact liability.77
Finally, the Court took note of the fact that the main purpose of the FHA is to
prohibit discrimination in housing.78 Allowing disparate impact claims is
therefore consistent with the statutory purpose of the FHA.79
However, although it found disparate impact claims cognizable under the FHA,
the Court was also careful to place restraints on disparate impact liability so as to
avoid certain constitutional questions.80 The Court made clear that disparate
impact liability is focused on the “removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers” and is not meant to displace “valid governmental policies.”81 Further,
the Court asserted that defendants should be given an opportunity to “explain
the valid interest served by their policies.”82 The Court also demanded a “robust
causality requirement” in disparate impact claims which requires the plaintiff to
identify the specific policy of the defendant that is allegedly responsible for the
disparate impact.83 Simply showing that a “statistical disparity” exists is
insufficient if the plaintiff cannot also show that the defendant’s practice actually
caused the disparity.84 The Court placed great emphasis on these safeguards at the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 545.
Id. at 530–34.
Id. at 528–33.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 533–34.
Id. at 535–38.
Id. at 535–36.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 540.
See id.
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id.
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prima facie stage to prevent race from being considered in a “pervasive way.” 85
The Court cautioned against “interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so
expansive as to inject racial considerations into every housing decision.”86 If these
precautions were not taken, the Court worried that disparate impact liability
would replace valid governmental and private interests instead of simply removing
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,” and that this would ultimately “set
our Nation back in its quest to reduce the salience of race in our social and
economic system.”87 Lastly, the Court clarified that, in crafting remedial orders,
lower courts should focus on eliminating the discriminatory practice and should
be wary of imposing racial quotas which could have serious constitutional
implications.88
Despite the Court’s emphasis on these constraints and safeguards, Justice
Kennedy concluded the opinion by returning to the purpose of the FHA and
stressing that “[m]uch progress remains to be made in our Nation’s continuing
struggle against racial isolation.”89 He highlighted the important role the FHA
plays in “avoiding the Kerner Commission’s grim prophecy” of a racially
segregated society and recognized the FHA’s “continuing role in moving the
nation toward a more integrated society.”90 Justice Kennedy clearly understood
the “need for an expansive reading of the FHA” and disparate impact liability in
order to accomplish these fair housing goals.91
V. THE 2020 DISPARATE IMPACT FINAL RULE
A. PURPOSE OF THE 2020 RULE
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, HUD
published a Federal Register notice on May 15, 2017, seeking public input on any
regulations that were potentially “outdated, ineffective, or excessively
burdensome.”92 HUD received many comments regarding its Disparate Impact
Final Rule from 2013 and the Court’s ruling in Inclusive Communities, and in
response, HUD published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on June 20,
2018, seeking comments on the 2013 Rule.93 Based on the public comments it
received, HUD subsequently published a Proposed Rule on August 19, 2019, in
the Federal Register.94 Ultimately, on September 24, 2020, HUD published a new
Final Rule.95 The 2020 Rule made slight changes to the Proposed Rule and
85. Id.
86. Id. at 543.
87. Id. at 544.
88. Id. at 544–45.
89. Id. at 546.
90. Id. at 546–47.
91. See Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New
and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 110 (2015).
92. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
42,854, 42,856 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 42,854, 42,857.
95. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
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substantially altered the disparate impact standard laid out by the 2013 Rule.96
According to HUD, the 2020 Rule was intended to amend the 2013 Rule to
make it more consistent with the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Inclusive
Communities.97 HUD pointed out that in determining whether disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA, the Court in Inclusive Communities did not
rely on HUD’s 2013 Rule in reaching its holding.98 Although the Court briefly
mentioned HUD’s 2013 Rule, it relied on its own analysis of the FHA and
disparate impact liability.99
B. HUD’S INTERPRETATION OF INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES
In interpreting the Court’s holding in Inclusive Communities, HUD paid
particular attention to the Court’s discussion of the standards for disparate impact
claims, necessary constraints on such claims, and the potential constitutional
questions raised by allowing broad disparate impact liability.100 For instance,
regarding the standard for a plaintiff’s prima facie case, HUD emphasized that the
Court articulated a “robust causality” requirement in which the plaintiff must
specify which of the defendant’s policies or practices allegedly caused the
discriminatory impact.101
Regarding necessary constraints on disparate impact claims, HUD also pointed
to the Court’s assertion that disparate impact liability should be limited in a way
that allows entities to make “practical business choices and profit-related
decisions.”102 Moreover, the Court also cautioned against adopting an
interpretation of disparate impact claims that would displace “valid governmental
and private priorities” and rejected a broad construction of disparate impact
liability that would effectively “inject racial considerations into every housing
decision.”103
Finally, HUD noted that the Court addressed potential constitutional
questions that could arise from failing to impose these “adequate safeguards at
the prima facie stage.”104 The Court warned against race being used in a “pervasive
way” and strongly disapproved of the use of racial quotas in housing.105 In shaping
remedial orders, the Court offered some guidance to lower courts by directing
them to narrowly focus their remedial orders on abolishing the “offending
practice” and work to “eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral means.”106
60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
96. See id.
97. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,854.
98. Id. at 42,855.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 542 (2015)).
102. Id. (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 533).
103. Id. at 42,856 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 521, 544).
104. Id. at 42,855 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 543).
105. Id. (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 542).
106. Id. at 42,856 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 544–45).
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C. THE NEW DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK
In response to public comments, HUD published its new Final Rule on
September 24, 2020.107 The 2020 Rule sets forth a new five-element framework
for establishing a disparate impact claim under the FHA, which replaces the 2013
Rule’s three-part, burden-shifting framework.108 Under the 2020 Rule, plaintiffs
must first identify a “specific, identifiable policy or practice” of the defendant that
has a discriminatory effect on a protected class, explain how that practice causes
the alleged disparate impact, and then plead sufficient facts to support each of the
five elements of the new framework.109 The plaintiff must prove each element by
a preponderance of the evidence110 and may not rely solely on evidence of
“statistical imbalances or disparities”; instead, the plaintiff must present sufficient
evidence that is “not remote or speculative.”111
The first element of the new framework requires the plaintiff to show that the
challenged policy is “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary to achieve a valid interest
or legitimate objective.”112 If the plaintiff successfully establishes this element, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to identify a “valid interest” that the
challenged policy is meant to serve.113 HUD acknowledged that under this
element, plaintiffs will not always be able to anticipate what legitimate objective
the defendant will put forth and therefore will have difficulty pleading this
element with sufficient facts.114 HUD ambiguously stated that a pleading
“plausibly alleging” that no legitimate objective is served by the defendant’s
practice would be considered sufficient.115 If the defendant is able to carry its
burden and show that its challenged policy advances a valid interest, the burden
then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, “that the interest (or interests) advanced by the defendant are not valid
or that a less discriminatory alternative exists.”116 This is a particularly heavy
burden to meet as the plaintiff must show that this proposed alternative is able to
“serve the defendant’s identified interest (or interests) in an equally effective
manner without imposing materially greater costs on, or creating other material
burdens for, the defendant.”117
The second element requires the plaintiff to show that the challenged policy
107. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288, 60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
108. See id.
109. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1)–(5) (2020).
110. Id. § 100.500(c)(1).
111. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,860. Although the Final 2020 Rule eliminates the originally proposed “not remote or
speculative” language, HUD did so only because it viewed this language as redundant. HUD’s
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,322.
112. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1) (2020).
113. Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
114. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858.
115. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 60,311.
116. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2020).
117. Id.
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has a “disproportionately adverse effect on members of a protected class.”118 A
“protected class” according to the FHA refers to “members of a particular race,
color, religion, sex, [disability,] familial status, or national origin.”119 However,
HUD complicated this element by clarifying that, according to its interpretation
of Inclusive Communities, the plaintiff must not only allege that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class under the FHA and would be adversely affected by
the challenged policy but also demonstrate that the challenged policy has a
discriminatory effect “‘against a protected class,’ as a group.”120
The third element requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a “robust causal link”
between the challenged policy and a discriminatory effect on individuals of a
protected class.121 Disparate impact claims that rely on statistical evidence cannot
depend solely on the existence of a disparity and must be able to show how the
challenged policy is the “actual cause of the disparity.”122
The fourth element requires the plaintiff to allege that the disparate impact
caused by the challenged policy is “significant.”123 Even if a disparity exists, if it is
not significant or material, the plaintiff will fail to satisfy this element and
therefore will fail to state a claim.124 HUD explained that, if defendants could be
held liable for insignificant, non-material disparities, they would turn to using
racial quotas in order to combat potential disparities and avoid disparate impact
liability.125 In support of this element, HUD pointed to language from Inclusive
Communities that stressed the importance of avoiding the introduction of “racial
considerations into every housing decision.”126 However, HUD did not provide a
definition of what constitutes a material or significant disparity; rather, HUD
merely hinted that a material disparity is one that is not “negligible,” is actually
caused by the discriminatory policy, and is not “attributable to chance.”127
The fifth and final element requires that the plaintiff prove “[t]hat there is a
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”128
In choosing to add this element, HUD did not rely on any language from Inclusive
Communities, but rather argued that it was simply codifying “the proximate cause
requirement found under the Fair Housing Act.”129 The FHA’s proximate cause
118. Id. § 100.500(b)(2).
119. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)); see HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,314 (noting that the failure to include disability as a
protected class in the Proposed Rule was an unintentional oversight).
120. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858 (quoting Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 364 (6th Cir. 2015)).
121. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(3) (2020).
122. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858.
123. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(4) (2020).
124. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 544 (2015)).
127. Id. at 42,858–59.
128. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(5) (2020).
129. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
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requirement demands that a direct relationship exist between the plaintiff’s injury
and the challenged conduct of the defendant.130
If a plaintiff successfully brings a disparate impact claim that meets all five
elements, the 2020 Rule provides the defendant with several defenses, depending
on the stage of litigation.131 At the pleading stage, the defendant “may argue that
the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead one of the elements of the prima facie
case.”132 The defendant can also show that its conduct is “reasonably necessary to
comply with a third-party requirement,” such as a federal, state, or local law;
binding regulation; or binding administrative order.133 However, HUD failed to
elaborate on what it means for a defendant’s policy to be “reasonably necessary”
to establish this defense.134 HUD rationalized the inclusion of this particular
defense by asserting that it allows a defendant to attack the causality element of
the plaintiff’s claim and works to establish that the defendant’s policy is not the
actual cause of the disparate impact.135
After the pleading stage, the defendant has three defenses available.136 The first
defense pertains to the defendant’s use of “predictive model[s]” and “practices
that predict outcomes, such as risk analysis.”137 The defendant can show that the
plaintiff failed to meet their burden of proof if “the prediction represents a valid
interest” and the prediction “does not or would not have a disparate impact on
protected classes compared to similarly situated individuals not part of the
protected class.”138 This defense was added to the 2020 Rule by HUD as “an
alternative for the algorithm defenses” set forth in the Proposed Rule.139 In the
Proposed Rule, if the plaintiff challenged a policy that relied on an algorithmic
model, the defendant could defeat the plaintiff’s claim through one of three ways:
(i) Identifying the inputs used in the model and showing that these inputs
are not substitutes for a protected characteristic and that the model is
predictive of risk or other valid objective; (ii) showing that a recognized third
party, not the defendant, is responsible for creating or maintaining the
model; or (iii) showing that a neutral third party has analyzed the model in
question and determined it was empirically derived, its inputs are not
substitutes for a protected characteristic, the model is predictive of risk or
other valid objective, and is a demonstrably and statistically sound
at 42,859.
130. See id. (quoting Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017)).
131. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(1)–(2) (2020).
132. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288, 60,289–90 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
133. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(1) (2020).
134. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed.
Reg. at 60,317.
135. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,859.
136. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2) (2020).
137. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 60,290.
138. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2)(i) (2020).
139. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 60,290.
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algorithm.140
However, HUD removed this algorithmic defense from the 2020 Rule over
concerns that the defense would prove “unnecessarily broad.”141 Moreover, HUD
noted that “there will be further development in the law in the emerging
technology area of algorithms, artificial intelligence, machine learning and similar
concepts” and therefore “it is premature at this time to more directly address
algorithms.”142
Next, the second defense available after the pleading stage allows the defendant
to show that the plaintiff failed to prove the prima facie case.143 Finally, the third
defense again allows the defendant to show that its conduct was “reasonably
necessary to comply with a third-party requirement.”144
VI. COMPARISON OF THE 2013 RULE AND THE 2020 RULE
In order to anticipate potential consequences of the 2020 Rule, it is necessary
to analyze both the ways in which the 2020 Rule and the 2013 Rule are consistent
with one another and the ways in which the rules differ. At a minimum, obviously,
both continue to allow for disparate impact liability under the FHA.145 However,
whereas the text of the 2013 Rule began with a definition of “discriminatory
effect,”146 the 2020 Rule removes this allegedly redundant definition from its
language altogether.147 Under the 2013 Rule, a discriminatory effect occurred
when a policy or practice “actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on
a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated
housing patterns” because of a protected characteristic under the FHA.148 The
2020 Rule offers no corresponding definition of discriminatory effect and HUD
argues such a definition is redundant because it is effectively captured in the
elements of the 2020 Rule.149 However, relying on a combination of five new
elements to provide a definition of discriminatory effect is much less clear than if
HUD had simply set forth a concise definition. It seems unnecessary for HUD to
have deleted a helpful definition from the opening language of the 2020 Rule.
Without an explicit definition of arguably the most important term in the entire
rule, HUD seems to have opened the door for unnecessary confusion among
140. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,859.
141. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 60,290.
142. Id.
143. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2)(ii) (2020).
144. Id. § 100.500(d)(2)(iii).
145. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2013)); HUD’s Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,288.
146. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013) (amended 2020).
147. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2020); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,858 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
148. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013) (amended 2020).
149. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858.
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litigants.
In comparing the frameworks of the two rules, the entire three-part burdenshifting framework of the 2013 Rule is, arguably, largely captured in the first
element of the 2020 Rule. Specifically, whereas the 2013 Rule required that the
plaintiff prove a discriminatory effect, allowed the defendant to show a sufficient
justification for the practice, and then allowed the plaintiff to show a less
discriminatory alternative,150 the first element of the 2020 Rule requires the
plaintiff to show that the challenged policy is unnecessary to achieve a valid
interest.151 If the defendant can show that the practice is necessary, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that there is an alternative practice that does
not impose a material burden on the defendant.152 However, while both rules shift
the burden back to the plaintiff and allow them to demonstrate that a less
discriminatory alternative exists, the 2020 Rule substantially heightens this
burden by adding that the alternative must also be “equally effective” and cannot
impose “greater costs” or “other material burdens” on the defendant.153 This is a
higher standard than simply showing that a less discriminatory alternative practice
exists. Further, there is a notable evidentiary distinction between the two rules as
well. While the 2013 Rule stated that, in showing that a sufficient justification for
the challenged practice exists, the defendant may not use “hypothetical or
speculative” evidence,154 the 2020 Rule reverses the roles and indicates that it is
the plaintiff who cannot rely solely on statistical or speculative evidence.155
Beyond the initial overlap between the burden-shifting framework of the 2013
Rule and the first element of the 2020 Rule, the 2020 Rule adds significant
requirements that do not correspond to any language in the 2013 Rule. For
instance, the 2020 Rule requires both proximate cause and a robust causality
between the disparity and the challenged practice,156 but the 2013 Rule only
required the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged policy “caused or
predictably will cause” a disparate impact.157 Thus, the 2020 Rule adds a
heightened causality requirement for plaintiffs.
Additionally, the 2020 Rule clarifies that the challenged policy must adversely
impact a protected class as a group, rather than simply showing that the plaintiff
is a member of a protected group and is adversely impacted as an individual.158
While the text of the 2013 Rule referred to “a disparate impact on a group of
persons,”159 it did not place the same emphasis on demonstrating that the
protected group, rather than an individual of a protected group, is adversely

150. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1)–(3) (2013) (amended 2020).
151. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1) (2020).
152. Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
153. Id.
154. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(ii)(2) (2013) (amended 2020).
155. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed.
Reg. 42,854, 42,860, 42,863 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
156. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(3),(5) (2020).
157. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013) (amended 2020).
158. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858.
159. 24 C.F.R § 100.500(a) (2013) (amended 2020).
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impacted by a challenged practice.160
Finally, the 2020 Rule requires that the alleged disparate impact be significant,
although HUD provides no definition or explanation of what constitutes a
significant disparity.161 There was no corresponding significance requirement in
the text of the 2013 Rule, rather, the plaintiff had to prove only that the
challenged practice either “predictably results in a disparate impact” or results in
a perpetuation of housing segregation.162 The 2013 Rule made no distinction
between so-called significant and insignificant disparate impacts.
Besides these significant differences in the frameworks, the 2020 Rule also
includes specific defenses that the defendant may use to rebut the plaintiff’s claim
both at the pleading stage and after the pleading stage.163 The 2013 Rule included
no such advantages for the defendant; rather, the 2013 Rule merely allowed the
defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s claim by proving that the challenged practice is
necessary to one of its “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory” interests.164
The two rules also appear to be motivated by different policy concerns and
reflect different conceptions of the FHA’s purpose and its proper role in
combating housing discrimination. Specifically, comparing the Federal Register
publications of the 2013 Rule, the Proposed Rule, and the 2020 Rule reveals key
differences in the way the FHA is framed. These different conceptions of the
FHA’s purpose shed light on the rationale behind certain differences in the two
rules. The 2013 Rule highlighted the “broad remedial intent” of the FHA and its
prohibition of both intentional discrimination and practices with discriminatory
effects.165 It emphasized that the text of the FHA is “broad and inclusive” and
should be interpreted as such in order to effectively combat housing segregation,
end racial discrimination, achieve racial integration, and promote equal
opportunity.166 While the Proposed Rule also briefly acknowledged the “broad
and inclusive” language of the FHA, it moved on from this discussion quickly and
instead placed significant emphasis on language from Inclusive Communities that
stressed the importance of safeguards and constraints on disparate impact liability
at the prima facie stage.167 Specifically, HUD cited the Court’s warning against
forcing defendants to resort to the use of racial quotas in an effort to avoid FHA
liability.168 HUD argued that, without such safeguards, disparate impact liability
would effectively set “our Nation back in its quest to reduce the salience of race
in our social and economic system.”169 This brief discussion of the FHA and
160. See id.
161. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(4) (2020); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858.
162. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013) (amended 2020).
163. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(1)–(2) (2020).
164. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2013) (amended 2020).
165. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,461 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2013)).
166. Id.
167. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
42,854, 42,855 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
168. Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576
U.S. 519, 542–43 (2015)).
169. Id. (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 544)).
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repeated emphasis on safeguards is consistent with, and partly explains the
rationale behind, the heightened requirements for the plaintiff and newly
available defenses for defendants. In the 2020 Rule, HUD went even further and
declared that it was “exercising its discretion” in interpreting the FHA’s disparate
impact standard in this new, more demanding way.170
VII. COMPARISON OF THE 2020 RULE AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
RULING IN INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES
Given that HUD allegedly proposed its new disparate impact rule in order to
comply with the Court’s ruling in Inclusive Communities, it is necessary to evaluate
whether, and to what extent, the 2020 Rule is consistent with the ruling. At a
minimum, both the 2020 Rule and the ruling in Inclusive Communities hold that
disparate impact liability is available under the FHA.171 While the Court in
Inclusive Communities did not set forth a specific standard for bringing a disparate
impact claim, it did examine several considerations and constraints that it believed
should be incorporated into a disparate impact standard.172 Although the 2020
Rule manages to incorporate several of these considerations and constraints into
its new five-part framework, it does so in a manner that imposes heightened
standards for plaintiffs above and beyond what is required by Inclusive
Communities.
The 2020 Rule’s first element, which requires a plaintiff to show the challenged
practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary to achieve a valid interest or
legitimate objective,”173 is consistent with the Court’s direction that disparate
impact liability should be focused on the “removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers” and is not meant to displace “valid governmental
policies.”174 HUD lifted the language for this first element right out of Inclusive
Communities. HUD argued that this first element is consistent with the Court’s
instruction that disparate impact liability should not be construed too broadly or
prevent parties from “achieving legitimate objectives.”175 Further, consistent with
language from Inclusive Communities, the 2020 Rule gives defendants the
opportunity to justify their challenged policy and show that it is necessary to
advance a valid interest.176 The Court stated that allowing a defendant to justify
its challenged policy is important because it ensures disparate impact claims are
“properly limited” so as to avoid constitutional issues.177 However, in rebutting
the defendant’s justification for its challenged practice, Inclusive Communities—
relying on Title VII and ADEA precedent—only requires that a plaintiff
170. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288, 60,289 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
171. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2020); Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 545–46.
172. Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 540–45.
173. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1) (2020).
174. See Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 540 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
175. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
42,854, 42,858 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
176. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2020).
177. Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 540.
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demonstrate that a less discriminatory alternative practice exists; it does not
impose the same heightened requirements found in the 2020 Rule.178 Thus,
although the 2020 Rule still allows the plaintiff to rebut the defendant’s
justification for its challenged practice, HUD chose to heighten the standard for
plaintiffs when it crafted the 2020 Rule.
The second element requires a showing that the challenged practice
disproportionately and adversely affects not just a member of a protected class as
an individual, but members of a protected class as a group.179 HUD claimed this
element is consistent with Inclusive Communities but has not explained how it is
consistent or what language from the ruling it relies upon.180 In examining the
Court’s reasoning, there does not appear to be any discussion of this “individual
of a protected group” versus “protected group” distinction that the 2020 Rule
adopts. Thus, it appears that, contrary to what HUD asserted, this particular
element finds no support in Inclusive Communities.
The third element, which requires that the plaintiff demonstrate a “robust
causal link between the challenged policy or practice and the adverse effect on
members of a protected class,” is seemingly consistent with Inclusive Communities
and lifts this language right out of the Court’s decision.181 The Court’s “robust
causality requirement” demanded that the plaintiff identify the specific policy
responsible for the disparity at issue.182 Under both the holding and the 2020
Rule, simply showing the existence of a statistical disparity is insufficient if the
plaintiff cannot also show that the challenged practice is actually responsible for
causing the disparity.183 The Court believed this causality requirement would help
prevent defendants from facing liability for racial disparities that they were not
responsible for creating.184
The fourth element requires that the alleged disparity be significant.185 In
drafting this new significance requirement, HUD relied on language from Inclusive
Communities that warned lower courts against reading disparate impact liability in
such a broad manner that would force defendants to turn to racial quotas and
effectively introduce racial considerations into all housing situations.186 In order
to avoid such an expansive reading of disparate impact liability, HUD chose to
add a requirement that the disparity at issue be significant.187 Thus, this element
178. See id. at 533; 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2020); see also HUD’s Implementation of the Fair
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,859.
179. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(2) (2020); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858.
180. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 42,858; HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85
Fed. Reg. 60,288, 60,313–14 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
181. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(3) (2020); Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 542; see also HUD’s
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858.
182. Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. 519 at 542.
183. See id.; HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84
Fed. Reg. at 42,858.
184. See Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. 519 at 542.
185. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(4) (2020).
186. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 42,858; Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. 519 at 545.
187. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed.
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finds support in the text of Inclusive Communities although the Court itself does
not use any such language regarding significance.188 Additionally, as discussed
previously, HUD’s 2020 Rule does not provide a definition of what constitutes a
significant disparity.189 The only hint that HUD provided is that a significant
disparity is not “negligible” and is actually caused by the defendant’s practice.190
The fifth and final element requires the plaintiff to show that “there is a direct
relation between the injury asserted and injurious conduct alleged.”191 This
element seems strangely redundant given that the third element requires a robust
causal link between the challenged policy and the disparate impact.192 However,
HUD attributes this element to the FHA’s proximate cause requirement, rather
than to any language from Inclusive Communities.193 But, given that the fifth
element is so similar to the third element, it is arguably consistent with the
Inclusive Communities causality requirement as well.
While the 2020 Rule does find support in the language of Inclusive Communities
for several of its five elements, it also goes further than Inclusive Communities by
including specific defenses for the defendant to use in defeating a plaintiff’s prima
facie case.194 HUD argued that the first defense, in which the defendant can show
its conduct was limited by a third party requirement, goes to rebut the causal link
between the defendant’s conduct and the disparate impact.195 However, while the
causality requirement is supported by language from Inclusive Communities, this
particular defense refuting that requirement is not included in the Court’s
reasoning. Similarly, the outcome prediction defense, which replaced the
algorithmic model defense from the Proposed Rule, is not rooted in any language
from Inclusive Communities.196 HUD went far beyond the text of Inclusive
Communities in creating these advantages for defendants.
Finally, in shaping a remedy for a disparate impact violation, HUD relied on
language from Inclusive Communities which directed lower courts to shape their
remedial orders narrowly and focus on eliminating the discriminatory practice
and disparities through “race-neutral means.”197 The 2020 Rule states that
“remedies should be concentrated on eliminating or reforming the discriminatory
practice so as to eliminate disparities between persons in a particular protected
Reg. at 42,858.
188. See Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. 519 at 541–43.
189. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 42,858; HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85
Fed. Reg. 60,288, 60,314 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
190. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,858.
191. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(4) (2020).
192. Id. § 100.500(b)(3).
193. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,859.
194. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(1)–(2) (2020).
195. Id. § 100.500(d)(1); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,859.
196. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2)(i) (2020).
197. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 42,856; Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 544
(2015).
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class and other persons”198—reiterating HUD’s previous emphasis on construing
disparate impact liability narrowly and avoiding the introduction of racial
considerations when possible.
VIII. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2020 RULE
A. CRITICISM OF THE 2020 RULE
Despite finding support in Inclusive Communities for several of its new elements,
the 2020 Rule has been met with sharp criticism by those who believe it will have
negative consequences for the future of disparate impact liability and will interfere
with the FHA’s goal of eliminating racial discrimination and segregation in
America.199 Among the critics’ main arguments are concerns that the 2020 Rule
departs from decades of relatively consistent judicial and agency precedent, that it
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Inclusive Communities, and that
it undermines a crucial aspect of civil rights law.200 There are also evidentiary
concerns that the 2020 Rule significantly heightens the burden of proof for
plaintiffs and demands that plaintiffs plead an unreasonable amount of evidence
to satisfy each element before reaching the discovery phase.201
B. THE 2020 RULE DEPARTS FROM PRECEDENT
Some critics of the rule, such as the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
argue that the 2020 Rule departs from decades of judicial precedent and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities.202 To these critics, the Court
affirmed decades of precedent from the federal courts of appeals regarding
disparate impact liability and did not set forth any new substantive law in Inclusive
Communities.203 Further, it was upon this decades-long precedent that HUD based
its burden-shifting framework and the 2013 Rule in the first place, thus rendering
the creation of the new 2020 Rule unnecessary.204 Additionally, in the years since
Inclusive Communities, several federal courts of appeals have found that the Court
actually embraced HUD’s 2013 Rule framework in Inclusive Communities.205 The
Second Circuit found that the Supreme Court implicitly adopted HUD’s
framework by placing the burden of proving a less discriminatory alternative on

198. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(f) (2020).
199. See, e.g., Kriston Capps, How HUD Could Dismantle a Pillar of Civil Rights Law, CITY LAB
(Aug. 16, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/08/fair-housing-act-huddisparate-impact-discrimination-lenders/595972/ [https://perma.cc/PUR6-26H6].
200. U.S. Comm’n on C.R., Comment Letter in Opposition to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
re HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard 2 (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.usccr.gov/press/2019/10-18-HUD-Disparate-Impact-Proposed-Rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A635-RM8G] [hereinafter Opinion Letter].
201. See id.; Capps, supra note 199.
202. Opinion Letter, supra note 200, at 2.
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id. at 5–6; Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2013)).
205. Opinion Letter, supra note 200, at 5–6.
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the plaintiff rather than the defendant.206 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Inclusive Communities to adopt a burden-shifting framework by requiring that a
defendant in a disparate impact action demonstrate that its challenged policy has
a sufficient justification in order to carry its burden of proof.207 In litigation
subsequent to the Inclusive Communities decision, HUD itself made comments that
Inclusive Communities and the 2013 Rule are “entirely consistent” with each
other.208 Indeed, HUD even argued that “nothing in Inclusive Communities casts
any doubt on the validity of the Rule,” insisting that the Supreme Court even
“cited the Rule twice in support of its analysis.”209 As further proof of the
consistency between the 2013 Rule and the Court’s ruling, HUD pointed to the
fact that in applying the Court’s reasoning on remand, the district court
concluded that the 2013 Rule’s burden-shifting framework was the correct
standard to be applied for disparate impact liability.210 Given that the 2013 Rule
was consistent with decades-long interpretation by HUD and with precedent from
eleven federal courts of appeals, the substantially different framework introduced
by the 2020 Rule will likely lead to confusion among parties in the housing
industry, unpredictability in the courts, and increased litigation over the precise
meaning of the new standard.211
C. IMPORTANCE OF DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY IN CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Advocates of disparate impact liability argue that it is an important tool of civil
rights law because housing discrimination and racial segregation give rise to, and
are often intertwined with, other forms of discrimination such as education and
employment discrimination.212 Because homeownership is an important source
of household wealth, strong housing protections are also important to close the
wealth gap between Whites and non-Whites.213 For the average American
household, housing equity accounts for roughly two-thirds of total household
wealth.214 Recent data has indicated that Black households have ten times less
wealth than White households.215 Disparate impact liability is a critical tool in
rooting out housing discrimination “[b]ecause direct proof of subjective intent is

206. Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2d Cir. 2016).
207. Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 512–13 (9th Cir. 2016).
208. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 9, Prop.
Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (No. 1:13-CV-08564).
209. Id. (emphasis in original).
210. Id.
211. See Shaun Donovan, The Trump Administration Is Clearing the Way for Housing Discrimination,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/opinion/fair-housing-acttrump.html [https://perma.cc/2MB9-AZDV].
212. Opinion Letter, supra note 200, at 3.
213. Donovan, supra note 211.
214. Janelle Jones, The Racial Wealth Gap: How African-Americans Have Been Shortchanged Out of
the Materials to Build Wealth, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (Feb. 13, 2017, 12:01 PM),
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-racial-wealth-gap-how-african-americans-have-been-shortchanged-outof-the-materials-to-build-wealth/ [https://perma.cc/QU3F-BGDX].
215. WILLIAM DARITY JR., DARRICK HAMILTON, MARK PAUL, ALAN AJA, ANNE PRICE,
ANTONIO MOORE & CATERINA CHIOPRIS, WHAT WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 7–8 (2018).
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likely to be unavailable” to plaintiffs.216 Weakening the method by which plaintiffs
can challenge housing discrimination will perpetuate segregated housing patterns,
exacerbate other forms of discrimination, and help preserve the current racial
wealth gap among American households.217
D. THE 2020 RULE INCREASES THE BURDEN OF THE PLAINTIFF
Other critics oppose the 2020 Rule because they believe it significantly
increases the plaintiff’s burden in a way that potentially prohibits them from being
able to bring disparate impact claims.218 This heightened standard for the plaintiff
is apparent at the outset simply by observing the fact that the 2020 Rule replaces
the 2013 Rule’s three-part burden-shifting framework with a much more rigorous
five-element framework and builds in extra defenses for defendants but provides
no corresponding advantages for the plaintiff.219 According to the 2020 Rule, a
plaintiff must prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence.220 Forcing
plaintiffs to plead substantial evidence to meet each of the five elements before
getting to the discovery phase greatly weakens the use of disparate impact liability
as a tool to eliminate housing discrimination.221 Moreover, under the 2013 Rule,
the plaintiff only had to prove that the challenged policy had a discriminatory
effect, and then the burden would shift to the defendant to provide a legally
sufficient justification for its challenged practice.222 Yet under the first element of
the 2020 Rule, this burden is reversed, and it is the plaintiff who must
demonstrate that the defendant’s challenged practice does not achieve a valid
interest or legitimate objective.223 HUD even acknowledged in the preamble to
the Proposed Rule that plaintiffs will likely fail at the outset in identifying a
“specific, identifiable, policy or practice” that has a discriminatory effect because
single events will likely not qualify as a “policy or practice” for purposes of the
rule.224 HUD made this declaration despite the fact that the Court in Inclusive
Communities viewed certain singular events as sufficient basis to bring a disparate
impact claim and despite the fact that two other federal courts of appeals have
ruled similarly to Inclusive Communities on this issue.225
E. THE 2020 RULE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE FHA
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 2020 Rule is inconsistent with both
the purpose of the FHA and HUD’s core mission. The FHA opens with the broad

216. Brief of Massachusetts as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16–18, Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015) (No. 13–1371).
217. See Opinion Letter, supra note 200, at 3.
218. Id. at 7.
219. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1)–(5), (d)(1)–(2) (2020).
220. Id. § 100.500(c)(1)–(c)(3).
221. Opinion Letter, supra note 200, at 6–7.
222. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1)–(2) (2013) (amended 2020).
223. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1) (2020).
224. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
42,854, 42,858 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019).
225. Opinion Letter, supra note 200, at 8.
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declaration that it is “the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”226 The
FHA was enacted after decades of overt racial discrimination in the housing
market and in response to the somber recognition that “[o]ur nation is moving
toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”227 HUD
echoes this fair housing goal and was specifically founded with the mission of
eradicating racial discrimination in housing.228 HUD specifically acknowledged
in the 2013 Rule that the FHA has a “broad remedial intent” aimed at eradicating
discrimination in the housing industry.229 In concluding his opinion in Inclusive
Communities, Justice Kennedy stressed that the “FHA must play an important part
in avoiding the Kerner Commission’s grim prophecy” and emphasized that the
FHA has a “continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated
society.”230 By significantly heightening the burden for the plaintiff and providing
extra advantages for the defendant, the 2020 Rule makes it harder for plaintiffs
to successfully bring disparate impact claims. Disparate impact liability has long
been viewed as a crucial tool to root out covert discrimination in housing. By
effectively preventing plaintiffs from challenging discriminatory practices on the
basis of disparate impact, the 2020 Rule undermines the purpose of the FHA and
thwarts the eradication of housing discrimination.
IX. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. FEDERAL LITIGATION
It is also worth noting that, since the publication of the 2020 Rule, there have
been a series of federal lawsuits challenging the new standard. Housing advocates
have brought cases in California,231 Connecticut,232 and Massachusetts.233 Most
notably, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a
preliminary injunction staying the implementation of the 2020 Rule on October
25, 2020—just one day before the rule was scheduled to take effect.234 The
Massachusetts Fair Housing Center and Housing Works, Inc. sought to vacate the
2020 Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).235 The Plaintiffs set
forth three arguments: “(1) the 2020 Rule is ‘contrary to law’; (2) the changes to
the 2013 Rule are ‘arbitrary and capricious’; and (3) the 2020 Rule’s inclusion of
the ‘outcome prediction defense,’ to be codified at 24 C.F.R § 100.500(d)(2)(i),
226. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
227. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, supra note 26.
228. THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 2.
229. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,461 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2013)).
230. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 546–47
(2015).
231. Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Carson, No. 20-07388 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 22, 2020).
232. Open Cmtys. All. v. Carson, No. 20-01587 (D. Conn. filed Oct. 22, 2020).
233. Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 20-11765, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 205633, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2020).
234. Id. at *21.
235. Id. at *10.
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violates the APA’s ‘notice and comment’ requirements.”236 The court addressed
only the second argument and concluded that the Plaintiffs demonstrated “a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits as to their claim that the 2020 Rule
is arbitrary and capricious under the APA.”237 The court found that the
“significant alterations” in the 2020 Rule “run the risk of effectively neutering
disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act” and “appear inadequately
justified” by HUD.238 Moreover, the court found that the “2020 Rule’s massive
changes pose a real and substantial threat of imminent harm . . . by raising the
burdens, costs, and effectiveness of disparate impact liability.”239 After balancing
the potential harm and public interest, the court granted a preliminary injunction
staying implementation of the 2020 Rule and enjoining its enforcement.240 Thus,
the effective date of the 2020 Rule has been postponed until the court reaches a
final judgment on the Plaintiffs’ APA claims.241
B. PRESIDENT BIDEN’S MEMORANDUM ON HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
On January 26, 2021, just days after assuming office, President Biden issued a
memorandum directing the Secretary of HUD to “examine the effects” of the
2020 Rule and “take any necessary steps” to “affirmatively [further] fair
housing.”242 President Biden began the memorandum with an acknowledgment
of the federal government’s role in “systematically implement[ing] racially
discriminatory housing policies.”243 He recognized that despite the passage of the
FHA, “access to housing and the creation of wealth through homeownership have
remained persistently unequal” and understands that the government “has a
critical role to play in overcoming and redressing this history of discrimination.”244
He interprets the language of the FHA as “not only a mandate to refrain from
discrimination but a mandate to take actions that undo historic patterns of
segregation and other types of discrimination and that afford access to long-denied
opportunities.”245 He set forth the policy of his administration as follows:
Accordingly, it is the policy of my Administration that the Federal
Government shall work with communities to end housing discrimination,
to provide redress to those who have experienced housing discrimination, to
eliminate racial bias and other forms of discrimination in all stages of homebuying and renting, to lift barriers that restrict housing and neighborhood
choice, to promote diverse and inclusive communities, to ensure sufficient
physically accessible housing, and to secure equal access to housing
236. Id. at *15.
237. Id. at *18–19.
238. Id. at *18.
239. Id. at *19.
240. Id. at *20.
241. Id.
242. Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s History of
Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies, 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 202100090, at 2 (Jan.
26, 2021).
243. Id. at 1.
244. Id. at 1–2.
245. Id. at 2.
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opportunity for all.246
Thus, in light of this policy agenda, President Biden called upon the Secretary of
HUD to reexamine the 2020 Rule.
X. CONCLUSION
Although the 2020 Rule arguably finds textual support in the language of
Inclusive Communities for several of its five elements, HUD made the deliberate
choice to go beyond the Court’s language in crafting its new standard. By
heightening the plaintiff’s burden even further than required by the Court’s
ruling and providing advantageous new defenses for defendants, HUD has greatly
reduced the effectiveness of disparate impact liability as a tool to fight housing
discrimination. In light of the broad remedial intent of the FHA, the core mission
of HUD to eradicate housing discrimination, decades of disparate impact
precedent, various negative consequences of the new standard, and President
Biden’s recent memorandum on housing discrimination, HUD should abandon
the 2020 Rule and readopt the 2013 Rule.

246. Id.

